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Introduction 
On 21 July 1879, Jules Laforgue – then eighteen years old – wrote to the administrator 
of the Bibliothèque nationale in Paris to request a library card. In his letter, he states that he 
has been frequenting the library’s publicly accessible annexe in the rue Colbert ‘avec assiduité’ 
for the past two years, but has found it wanting ‘quant aux ouvrages des philosophes, des poètes 
et des auteurs dramatiques contemporains’.1 With a certain humility, he explains that he holds 
no position that might justify his request, although he does not mention that this was because 
he had recently failed his baccalauréat for the third and final time, his crippling shyness having 
scuppered his chances in the oral exam. Instead, he wants to use the library to read and study 
in order to become a writer: ‘Mon seul but est de devenir littérateur’ (OC, I, 684). Although 
formal and ostensibly banal, this letter offers an important insight into the symbiotic 
relationship between Laforgue’s literary ambitions and his voracious appetite for reading. 
Indeed, his mature work presents a veritable bricolage of terms drawn from the various works 
he pored over in ‘la salle Colbert’ from 1877-79 and subsequently, having been granted the 
library card, in the Bibliothèque nationale itself. Within this array of lexical curios – picked, 
magpie-like, from medical, Classical, technical, ecclesiastical, and other vocabularies – there 
are some that have a privileged status in his aesthetics. Chief among these treasures are the 
terms taken from his reading of the German philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Eduard 
von Hartmann. 
 The central importance of philosophy to Laforgue’s  writing is, indeed, evident from 
his letter, which places the works of ‘philosophes’ at the head of his desiderata. It is also clear 
from the earnest pessimism of his first, unpublished collection Le Sanglot de la Terre (written 
in 1879-82). But the special significance of philosophical terms in his later poetry and prose is 
not easy to discern, at least at first glance. This is because of the irony that imbues his mature 
work, from Les Complaintes (mostly written in 1883-84, but not published until 1885) to 
Moralités légendaires (1886) and Derniers vers (the title posthumously given to the free-verse 
poems he wrote in 1886), an irony that makes his references to philosophical concepts 
(‘Inconscient’, ‘Absolu’, ‘Volonté’ and so on) appear as unserious as his use of other jargons.2 
                                                     
1 Jules Laforgue, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Jean-Louis Debauve et al, 3 vols (Lausanne: 
L’Âge d’Homme, 1986-2000), I, 684. Further references are given in the text as OC. 
2 Indeed, some critics argue that philosophy ‘est moins une pensée, qu’elle n’est pour 
Laforgue un registre’ (Philippe Bonnefis, ‘Entre Laforgue et Hartmann: le monologue de 
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Indeed, there is a ludic aspect to his use of philosophical language: Laforgue himself states that 
he ‘[va] [s]’arlequinant des défroques | Des plus grands penseurs de chaque époque’ 
(‘Esthétique’, OC, II, 168). Hartmannian garb is particularly prominent in this philosophical 
harlequinade, as J. A. Hiddleston has shown; ideas and images taken from Hartmann’s work 
are ‘transformed and given a new tonality, losing their philosophical or didactic solemnity and 
taking on that peculiarly strident and playful quality which characterizes Laforgue’s irony’.3 
This playfulness might even be seen as parodic in nature.  
In particular, the Moralités légendaires – where ‘Laforgue’s reworking of philosophy is most 
fully manifest’4 – has been read as a parody of the use of philosophical lexis, the philosophising 
of various characters (Hamlet, Salomé, the dragon of ‘Persée et Andromède’, Lohengrin, Pan) 
being characterised by an absurdly overblown or convoluted rhetoric.5 For example, Salomé’s 
vocéro – which replaces the erotic dance of the hypotext – is delivered in ‘a ludicrous prose 
replete with puns, alliteration, verbal play, periphrasis, and an abstract philosophical 
vocabulary’, and for Michèle Hannoosh this wordplay undermines the hymn’s proselytisation 
of Hartmannian thought.6 But parody does not necessarily imply ridicule; it ‘can be critically 
                                                     
Salomé’, Lendemains, 49 (1988), 57-69 (p. 62; author’s emphasis); see also Jean-Pierre 
Bernard, Les Complaintes de Jules Laforgue. Ironie et désenchantement (Paris: Klincksieck, 
1997), p. 66). 
3 J. A. Hiddleston, ‘Laforgue and Hartmann’, in Proceedings of the Xth Congress of the 
International Comparative Literature Association, 1982, ed. by Anna Balakian (New York, 
NY: Garland 1985), pp. 66-72 (p. 68). 
4 Madeleine Guy, ‘Jules Laforgue, Hartmann and Schopenhauer: From Influence to 
Rewriting’, in Questions of Influence in Modern French Literature, ed. by Thomas Baldwin, 
James Fowler and Ana de Medeiros (Basingstoke; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), pp. 58-70 (p. 59). 
5 See Michèle Hannoosh, Parody and Decadence: Laforgue’s ‘Moralités légendaires’ 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989). 
6 Hannoosh, p. 164. 
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constructive as well as destructive’.7 The fact that Laforgue’s references to philosophy are 
ostensibly jocular does not thus imply a lack of genuine engagement with philosophical ideas.8 
It is in his private notes that we find the clearest evidence to show that he engaged with 
German philosophy sincerely, profoundly and persistently. In fact, these notes – collated in the 
third and final volume of his Œuvres complètes, published in 2000 – demonstrate that his 
reception of Schopenhauer and Hartmann was essential to the development of his aesthetics. 
Gustave Kahn, one of the poet’s closest friends, emphasizes this point at the beginning of a 
pen-portrait of Laforgue in his 1902 work Symbolistes et décadents: 
La littérature, il la concevait non pas comme une chose par elle-même existante, mais comme 
un reflet, une traduction d’une philosophie.9 
Kahn also indicates that for Laforgue, philosophy was a matter of both literary importance and 
deeply personal significance: ‘il existait dans sa nature d’âme, un art, un besoin de saisir la 
philosophie comme une chose vitale’.10 Although the story that Laforgue always carried a copy 
of Hartmann’s Die Philosophie des Unbewussten (The Philosophy of the Unconscious) in his 
pocket11 is almost certainly apocryphal (the two volumes of this work ran to more than six 
hundred pages each), there is no doubt that Hartmann’s ideas were especially important to him. 
He even referred to the principle of the Unconscious as ‘ma religion’ (OC, III, 1149). His 
attitude towards the philosophy of Schopenhauer was more ambiguous, his notes showing that 
initial enthusiasm gave way to disillusionment; in his literary works, however, some of 
                                                     
7 Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms (New 
York, NY: Methuen, 2000), p. 32. 
8 On the role of philosophy in the Moralités légendaires, see Guy (2013) and Roger Pearson, 
‘The Voice of the Unconscious: Laforgue and the Poet as Lawgiver’, Dix-Neuf, 20, no. 1 
(2016), 125-44. 
9 Gustave Kahn, Symbolistes et décadents (Paris: L’Édition de Paris, 1902; repr. Geneva: 
Slatkine Reprints, 1977), p. 181. 
10 Ibid., p. 181. 
11 See Fernand Vial, ‘L’inconscient métaphysique et ses premières expressions littéraires en 
France: Jules Laforgue’, in Stil- und Formprobleme in der Literatur, ed. by Paul Böckmann 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), pp. 358-66 (p. 361); and Graham Dunstan Martin, 
‘Introduction’, in Jules Laforgue, Selected Poems, trans. by Graham Dunstan Martin 
(London: Penguin, 1998), pp. ix-xxxviii (p. xvii). 
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Schopenhauer’s ideas continue to play an important role alongside those of Hartmann.12 
Indeed, the dominant themes of Laforgue’s œuvre can be traced back to his reading of the two 
philosophers: pessimism in general and the sufferings of the body in particular; a nihilistic, 
atheistic view of the universe; the pervasive, almost inescapable presence of sexuality, 
accompanied by profound scepticism about romantic relationships. But despite the 
foundational importance of Schopenhauerian and Hartmannian ideas to his work, and despite 
his description of the philosophy of the Unconscious as his religion, Laforgue is far from being 
an unthinking devotee.13 Indeed, he is always in dialogue with Schopenhauer and Hartmann, 
revealing himself to be a subtle and, at times, critical philosophical interlocutor: he redisposes 
                                                     
12 Almost all of Laforgue’s critics acknowledge the crucial role played by Hartmann’s work 
(see, inter alia, David Arkell, Looking for Laforgue: an informal biography (Manchester: 
Carcanet, 1979), p. 140; Michael Collie, Jules Laforgue (London: The Athlone Press, 1977), 
p. 11; Médéric Dufour, Étude sur l’esthétique de Jules Laforgue: une philosophie de 
l’impressionnisme (Paris: Vanier, 1904), p. 1; Marie-Jeanne Durry, Jules Laforgue (Paris: 
Seghers, 1966), p. 86; Daniel Grojnowski, Jules Laforgue, les voix de la Complainte (La 
Rochelle: Rumeur des Âges, 2000), p. 21; Hiddleston (1985), p. 66; Pierre Reboul, Laforgue 
(Paris: Hatier, 1960), p. 171; Henri Scepi, Poétique de Jules Laforgue (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 2000), p. 14). Fewer refer to Schopenhauer, but his role in 
Laforgue’s thought is still widely recognized (see, for example, Jeanne Cuisinier, Jules 
Laforgue (Paris: Albert Messein, 1925), p. 115; Edwin Morgan, ‘Notes on the Metaphysics of 
Jules Laforgue’, Poetry, 69, no. 5 (February 1947), 266-72 (pp. 269-70); T. S. Eliot, The 
Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry, ed. by Ronald Schuhard (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 
p. 215; Hannoosh, p. 50). 
13 As Warren Ramsey comments, Laforgue’s theory of the Unconscious was ‘half-borrowed, 
half-invented’ (Warren Ramsey, ‘Introduction’, in Jules Laforgue: Essays on a Poet’s Life 
and Work, ed. by Warren Ramsey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), pp. 
xii-xxx (p. xx)); for Arkell, it was so unorthodox that ‘Hartmann would probably have 
disowned it’ (Arkell, p. 140). Dunstan Martin argues that ‘the disrespect with which he treats 
the great principles of Hartmann’s philosophy’ means that his approach is a kind of 
‘blasphemy’ (Dunstan Martin, p. xxx). In a similar vein, Bonnefis states that the Unconscious 
may be ‘le Dieu de Laforgue, mais Laforgue n’est pas son prophète’ (Philippe Bonnefis, 
‘Faire parler l’inconscient’, La Quinzaine Littéraire, 488 (16-30 June 1987), pp. 13-15 (p. 
13)).   
6 
 
 
not only philosophical language but also philosophical ideas, moulding them to form his own 
idiosyncratic credo – albeit one that is never solidified as a manifesto, instead remaining elusive 
and shifting. 
  Laforgue’s transfiguration of philosophical concepts and language is part of the broader 
question of what is at stake in the crossing of disciplinary borders, in the passage from 
philosophy to poetry. But another sort of crossing is also crucial to his reception of philosophy: 
that from one national culture (Germany) to another (France). This book explores how the 
‘othering’ of Germany and German philosophy – the perception of it as in some sense 
fundamentally opposed or alien to the French way of thinking – informs Laforgue’s reception 
of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and how ideas of otherness are in turn woven into his aesthetic 
principles. The importance of Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s philosophy to Laforgue has long 
been recognized, as has his free-thinking approach to it. But the ways in which this approach 
is imbricated with the broader intellectual and cultural context have been largely neglected. 
Laforgue’s thinking is not merely shaped by this context, but actively intervenes in it. In and 
through his engagement with philosophy, he deploys a range of strategies to challenge the 
demonization of other cultures: he celebrates otherness as a source of inspiration, 
reappropriating metaphors of ‘othering’; he demonstrates that otherness might, indeed, be 
contingent and thus fundamentally illusory given the immanent presence of an underlying 
unity; he locates otherness within the self in the form of the unconscious. Moreover, his uses 
of philosophy are closely connected to a critique of his own culture. His work thus thinks 
through not only notions of cultural otherness, but also ideas of how society might be otherwise.  
 
Le pessimisme d’outre-Rhin: the Philosophy of Schopenhauer and Hartmann14 
                                                     
14 This summary draws on the critical guides of Christopher Janaway (Schopenhauer 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)) and Bryan Magee (The Philosophy of 
Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)) on Schopenhauer, and Denis N. 
Kenedy Darnoi (The Unconscious and Eduard von Hartmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1967)) on Hartmann, as well as Sebastian Gardner’s chapter on Hartmann (‘Eduard von 
Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious’, in Thinking the Unconscious: Nineteenth-
Century German Thought, ed. by Angus Nicholls and Martin Liebscher (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 173-99). For fuller discussions of these philosophers 
and their thought, see these sources. 
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In Laforgue’s playful and parodic version of ‘Salomé’, the narrator describes the 
phantasmagorical cabaret provided for the amusement of the guests at the feast for the 
‘Tétrarque’: it includes a ‘jeune fille-serpent’, ‘une procession de costumes sacramentellement 
inédits, symbolisant chacun un désir humain’, and ‘des intermèdes d’horizontaux cyclones de 
fleurs électrisées’, as well as clowns, some of them ‘des clowns musiciens’, others performing 
a kind of absurdist philosophical theatre: 
Et trois autres clowns jouèrent l’Idée, la Volonté, l’Inconscient. L’Idée bavardait sur tout, la 
Volonté donnait de la tête contre les décors, et l’Inconscient faisait de grands gestes mystérieux 
comme un qui en sait au fond plus long qu’il n’en peut encore. (OC, II, 441) 
These three concepts – Idea, Will, and the Unconscious – are crucial to understanding 
Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s philosophy. They are also, therefore, vital to Laforgue’s literary 
project; but despite their fundamental importance for Laforgue, his published work only rarely 
makes reference to these philosophical terms directly (instead generally preferring euphemisms 
such as ‘l’Un-Tout’ or ‘l’Absolu’). Their embodiment as clowns is, in a sense, a metonym for 
the parodic treatment of philosophy in Laforgue’s work, a treatment that belies the 
underpinning role that philosophy plays for his thinking. For Ellen Sakari, the three clowns 
represent Hegel (‘l’Idée’), Schopenhauer (‘la Volonté’), and Hartmann (‘l’Inconscient’); for 
François Ruchon and Pierre-Olivier Walzer, they represent the three principles of Hartmann’s 
philosophy.15 Both interpretations are valid. Hartmann’s philosophy of the Unconscious is in 
fact an attempt to fuse the Hegelian concept of Idea and the Schopenhauerian concept of Will 
within his own concept of the Unconscious. This section explains Hartmann and 
Schopenhauer’s systems and how they are related to one another, as well as sketching out – in 
a preliminary fashion – some of Laforgue’s critical responses to his philosophical reading. 
Both Schopenhauer and Hartmann base their philosophical systems on Kant’s 
distinction between appearance (phenomena) and things in themselves (noumena). Kant argues 
that our knowledge of the world is limited to its phenomenal aspect, which we experience 
through the senses, and that the noumenal realm – the world as it is in itself – is fundamentally 
unknowable. But both Schopenhauer and Hartmann set out to discover the nature of this realm, 
the underlying principle governing our world. For Schopenhauer, this principle is Will: this is 
                                                     
15 Ellen Sakari, Prophète et Pierrot: thèmes et attitudes ironiques dans l’œuvre de Jules 
Laforgue (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 1974), p. 160; François Ruchon, Jules 
Laforgue: sa vie – son œuvre (Geneva: Éditions Albert Ciana, 1924), p. 146; Pierre-Olivier 
Walzer, OC, II, 584 n. 2. 
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the driving force of the universe, ‘the force that shoots and vegetates in the plant, indeed the 
force by which the crystal is formed, the force that turns the magnet to the North Pole’ and so 
on;16 in human existence, Will is manifested as ‘will to life (Wille zum Leben), a kind of blind 
striving, [...] which is directed towards the preservation of life, and towards engendering life 
anew’.17 Will, then, is ‘the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and also of 
the whole’ (WWR, I, 110). But this is not simply a variant of pantheism: Will is a blind force, 
governing the workings of living organisms and inanimate matter without any guiding purpose 
or rationality. The world cannot be divine, argues Schopenhauer, since its existence is 
meaningless. He asserts that ‘there is no co-ordinated purpose to nature’,18 or, indeed, to 
history, which is merely an endlessly repeated cycle. Progress is thus chimerical. In this, he 
deliberately and belligerently opposes the Hegelian philosophy of history: as Andrew Bowie 
points out, ‘Schopenhauer’s main animus is directed against any attempt, like that of Hegel, to 
suggest that history can be understood teleologically, as the locus of the realization of reason.’19 
 In this sense, Hartmann’s philosophy of the Unconscious constitutes an audacious 
philosophical enterprise: his explicitly stated aim is to reconcile Schopenhauer’s Will with 
Hegel’s concept of Idea, the very concept that entails a rationalist teleology. For Hartmann, 
Will and Idea are merely two aspects of the same force, the Unconscious. In this respect, he 
asserts that his most important philosophical predecessor is Schelling, whose Philosophie der 
Mythologie (Philosophy of Mythology) proves the inseparability of Will and Idea: without Will, 
Idea can only explain the logical essence of things, but not their existence, which is 
fundamentally irrational; without Idea, Will has no object, and is merely an empty striving for 
existence. However, Hartmann criticizes Schelling for failing to insist on the unconsciousness 
of the noumenon, which he deems to be essential to avoid lapsing into theism:20 like 
Schopenhauer, Hartmann is atheist. Hartmann also argues that Schelling’s principle is purely 
                                                     
16 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E. F. J. Payne, 2 
vols (New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1966), I, 110. Further references are given in the 
text as WWR. 
17 Janaway, p. 29. 
18 Janaway, p. 39. 
19 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics from Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2003), p. 262. 
20 As Darnoi notes, Schelling in fact states that he has ‘forsaken his earlier pantheistic 
position in his last or positive philosophy’ (Darnoi, p. 18). 
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abstract, and requires experimental verification; this is the basis of his aim ‘to restore again the 
proportion between the speculative and empirical aspects of philosophy’.21 He thus deems it 
crucial to place his philosophy on scientific foundations, as the sub-title of The Philosophy of 
the Unconscious indicates: ‘speculative results according to the inductive method of physical 
science’.22 Sebastian Gardner indicates the idiosyncrasy of this approach: 
In terms of his methodology, then, Hartmann is a naturalist, and his further peculiarity lies in 
his supposition that reflection on the results of the natural sciences is sufficient to warrant 
conclusions about the ultimate nature of reality which are thoroughly anti-materialist.23 
The first part of The Philosophy of the Unconscious uses this natural-scientific methodology to 
posit a teleological metaphysics of nature, attempting to attribute purposiveness to all natural 
phenomena. Hartmann draws extensively on biological research into animal instinct and reflex 
actions in both flora and fauna, and he thereby argues for the existence of an unconscious will 
in every living organism (a kind of vitalism24). Indeed, even conscious actions require a process 
of which we are unconscious. This idea of unconscious will is comparable to Schopenhauer’s 
notion of will to life, but it is crucial to note that for Hartmann, this will always has a definite 
aim, or idea; Will and Idea are both facets of the ultimate metaphysical principle, the 
Unconscious. Hartmann sees the operation of the Unconscious in every sphere of human 
existence: ethics, aesthetics, language, history and so on. 
 Laforgue’s faith in Hartmann’s philosophy is clear from the first ‘complainte’ proper, 
‘Complainte propitiatoire à l’Inconscient’, which transfigures the Lord’s Prayer as an appeal 
to the Unconscious. The poem’s subversion of Christian doctrine also points to Laforgue’s 
acceptance of the atheism propounded by both Schopenhauer and Hartmann, an atheism that 
is perhaps expressed most explicitly in his 1882 essay on Paul Bourget: here, he relates his 
belief that the garden of Creation has been ‘débarrassé soudain de son Jardinier impénétrable’ 
(OC, III, 127). However, Laforgue by no means endorses every aspect of Schopenhauer and 
                                                     
21 Darnoi, p. 19. 
22 Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious: speculative results according the 
inductive method of physical science, trans. by William Chatterton Coupland, 2nd edn 
(London: Kegan Paul, 1931). Further references are given in the text as PU. 
23 Gardner, p. 175; author’s emphasis. 
24 J. W. Burrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2000), p. 64. 
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Hartmann’s philosophical systems. In fact, he expresses profound scepticism about the 
nihilistic eschatology that the two philosophers share; that is, both envisage the ultimate 
annihilation of human life or (in Hartmann’s case) of the universe itself. For Schopenhauer, 
this annihilation is the logical end-point of his ethical doctrine of chastity (to which we shall 
turn shortly). It occupies only a minor role in Schopenhauer’s magnum opus Die Welt als Wille 
und Vorstellung (The World as Will and Representation), but gained (perhaps undue) 
prominence in late nineteenth-century France through a seminal 1870 interview he conducted 
with the journalist Paul Challemel-Lacour, in which Schopenhauer discussed how sexual 
abstinence would lead to the extinction of the human race. In Hartmann’s philosophical system, 
on the other hand, eschatology plays a crucial role, rather than merely constituting a by-product 
of ethics. For him, ‘the existence of the world is a mistake’25 and the purpose of the world is 
thus to return to the state of nothingness that pertained before Will and Idea were joined to 
form the Unconscious; this is to be achieved ‘through the development of a collective human 
consciousness which, upon achieving insight that the world ought not to be, brings itself and 
the world to an end’.26 How, exactly, the end of the world will be brought about by such a 
collective consciousness is not entirely clear. However, Hartmann does offer a detailed vision 
of the necessary steps to reach this insight, arguing that we must pass through three stages of 
illusion: firstly, the illusion that we can achieve happiness in this lifetime; secondly, that we 
can achieve happiness in an afterlife; thirdly, that happiness is possible for the human race in 
the future. In his notes, Laforgue seems to endorse this doctrine of three-fold illusion (see OC, 
III, 1133), but he ridicules the idea of ‘l’anéantissement universel’ (OC, III, 1135) as utterly 
fantastical, as even more impracticable than Schopenhauer’s vision of ‘la suppression du 
commerce sexuel dans l’humanité’ (OC, III, 1135). 
 This scepticism towards certain aspects of Hartmannian and Schopenhauerian 
metaphysics is symptomatic of Laforgue’s critical attitude towards his philosophical reading. 
His approach is, indeed, idiosyncratic in some respects. Perhaps most notably, his vision of the 
Unconscious itself is far from being a dogmatic reflection of Hartmann’s work; rather, he 
extrapolates from his philosophical material in various ways. For Laforgue, the Unconscious 
is both a force – sometimes blind, irrational and merciless, sometimes divinized as a source of 
wisdom and providence – and a domain. This domain is essentially utopian, and it is to be 
found, ultimately, within the self. In this sense, Hiddleston is perhaps right to say that what 
                                                     
25 Gardner, p. 187; author’s emphasis. 
26 Ibid., p. 187. 
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Laforgue took from Hartmann ‘was not so much a philosophical system and a certain 
vocabulary, but the idea of the Unconscious which was to appeal not just to his intellect, but 
more felicitously to his visual imagination’.27 Hartmann’s idea of the Unconscious provided 
the inspiration for him to survey the ‘inner domain [of the self]’ and ‘gave him the impetus to 
explore its extraordinary riches’.28 But this exploration was not Hartmann’s primary aim in 
writing The Philosophy of the Unconscious; he sought to provide, first and foremost, an account 
of the workings of the world at large rather than the internal world of the self. For Hartmann, 
the Unconscious is a metaphysical principle, and the unconscious life of the individual merely 
a manifestation of this principle. For Laforgue, on the other hand, the individual gains 
precedence over the metaphysical: he is fascinated, above all, by ‘les richesses de tons bizarres 
changeants qu’on a en fermant les yeux’, by ‘Les symphonies orageuses, les chœurs d’océans 
en se bouchant les oreilles’ (OC, III, 1158). As Hiddleston comments, in Laforgue’s work there 
is often ‘the sense of a breach which has been opened up affording a glimpse into another 
surreal, exotic or frighteningly alien world’29 – although this world is, in fact, more often a 
source of wonder and yearning than of fear. Laforgue’s concern with the individual is also 
evident in his focus on the ethical doctrines put forward by Schopenhauer and Hartmann; 
indeed, it is the ethical dimension of their philosophical systems that Laforgue engages with 
most intensely, more than metaphysics or (perhaps surprisingly) aesthetics.  
Both philosophers’ ethics emerge out of their metaphysical visions; both are, moreover, 
focused on the question of sexuality. Schopenhauer’s notion of Will as the fundamental 
metaphysical principle is premised on his argument concerning the body: he maintains that ‘the 
whole body is nothing but objectified will’ (WWR, I, 100), that bodily existence consists purely 
of willing. The corollary of this is the dethroning of reason as humankind’s dominant faculty, 
as the marker of our exceptionalism, an argument that constitutes Schopenhauer’s most radical 
departure from his philosophical predecessors according to Bryan Magee.30 Humanity’s 
intellectual capacities are merely a function of the will to life: at a certain point in our 
development, knowledge was required ‘for the preservation of the individual and the 
propagation of the species’ (WWR, I, 150). But it remains subordinate: ‘the intellect is the 
secondary phenomenon, the organism the primary’ (WWR, II, 201). His challenge to 
                                                     
27 Hiddleston (1985), p. 71; author’s emphasis. 
28 Ibid., p. 71. 
29 Hiddleston (1985), p. 71. 
30 Magee, p. 158. 
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rationalism is made even more controversial by his assertion that the sexual instinct constitutes 
the most powerful manifestation of the will to life in our bodies (WWR, I, 329). In ‘The 
Metaphysics of Sexual Love’, he goes so far as to say that the impulse to sexual gratification 
represents ‘the ultimate goal of almost all human effort’ (WWR, II, 534). This dictatorial 
instinct is like ‘a malevolent demon, striving to pervert, to confuse, and to overthrow 
everything’ (WWR, II, 534), and it exerts such control because what is at stake is ‘nothing less 
than the composition of the next generation’ (WWR, II, 534; author’s emphasis). Attraction to 
a particular person is simply the manifestation of the will to life of the future individual who 
would be born of that union (WWR, II, 535). We are thus slaves to the will of the species; sexual 
relations do not bring us happiness, and we only believe that they do because nature implants 
in us ‘a certain delusion’ (WWR, II, 538; author’s emphasis). The striving for sexual 
satisfaction, which furthers the species, is ‘at the expense of the individual’ (WWR, II, 540). 
The proof of this is that after the sexual urge has been satisfied, ‘everyone who is in love finds 
himself duped; for the delusion by means of which the individual was the dupe of the species 
has disappeared’ (WWR, II, 540). The will of the species is thus the ‘pursuer and enemy’ of the 
individual, in that it is ‘always ready ruthlessly to destroy personal happiness in order to carry 
out its ends’ (WWR, II, 556). Women are complicit in this ruse: this is the key to 
Schopenhauer’s notorious misogyny.  
However, despite this bleak account of sexual love, Schopenhauer does offer some 
hope. He argues that there is a solution to the suffering caused by desire: the denial of the will 
to life. He sees this as a kind of pseudo-religious salvation and he ‘is keen to link his 
philosophical discussion with Christianity, Brahmanism, and Buddhism, claiming that the core 
of all these religions [...] is really the same.’31 In order to deny the will to life, we must turn 
against our own bodies and cease to seek egoistic ends, in particular sexual gratification. 
Asceticism is thus at the core of Schopenhauer’s ethics, primarily in the sense of the denial of 
sexual desire – the strongest manifestation of the will to life – but also through poverty, fasting 
and so on. For Schopenhauer, suffering is caused not only by sexual desire, but by all forms of 
striving (needing, wanting, aiming), since striving for anything implies experiencing 
deficiency: 
All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering. Fulfilment brings this 
to an end; yet for one wish that is fulfilled there remain at least ten that are denied. Further, 
desiring lasts a long time, demands and requests go on to infinity; fulfilment is short and meted 
out sparingly. (WWR, I, 196; author’s emphasis) 
 
                                                     
31 Janaway, p. 91. 
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In short, willing dooms us to suffer: 
so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of 
desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never 
obtain lasting happiness or peace. (WWR, I, 196) 
Even if we find ourselves with nothing to strive for, we are prone to suffering in the form of 
ennui (WWR, I, 312). For the majority of human beings, then, ‘life swings like a pendulum to 
and fro between pain and boredom’ (WWR, I, 312). But asceticism offers a way out of this 
predicament, a way to get off the misery-go-round. 
 Hartmann concurs with many aspects of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic vision. In 
particular, he echoes his cynical view of sexual love. For Hartmann, as for Schopenhauer, the 
sexual instinct is predominant in human existence, representing the most powerful 
manifestation of the Unconscious in humankind. He also agrees that sexuality is a pernicious 
force: ‘in love one has not to do with a farce, a romantic drollery, but with a very real power, a 
demon who ever and again demands his victims’; this is a demon who ‘makes the whole world 
dance on his fool’s rope’ (PU, p. 230). Love is merely an illusion, as demonstrated by its 
decline after sexual satisfaction: ‘No passion of love very long survives enjoyment’ (PU, p. 
231). Again, Hartmann adopts the Schopenhauerian explanation for attraction to a particular 
person, maintaining that this shows how we are duped by the Unconscious into producing the 
ideal offspring: ‘the dreamed-of bliss in the arms of the beloved one is nothing but the deceptive 
bait, by means of which the Unconscious deludes conscious egoism, and leads to the sacrifice 
of self-love in favour of the succeeding generation’ (PU, p. 234; author’s emphasis). But at this 
point Hartmann departs from Schopenhauer’s theory of love, instead drawing on Darwinian 
thought to argue that the delusion of love is, in fact, ‘indispensable’ (PU, p. 235; author’s 
emphasis) because the ‘welfare and most favourable constitution of the next generation’ (PU, 
p. 235) is of the utmost importance: 
the ennoblement of the species is brought about, in addition to the succumbing of the more unfit 
specimens of the race through the struggle for existence, by means of a natural instinct of sexual 
selection. Nature knows no higher interests than those of the race, for the race is related to the 
individual, as the infinite to the finite. (PU, p. 234; author’s emphasis)  
Awareness of this process necessarily raises a conflict with selfish interests, but Hartmann 
holds that it is possible for conscious thought to ‘disengage itself from the point of view of 
egoism’ and even ‘be brought by deeper insight passively to permit Nature’s ends to be 
accomplished in preference to its own’ (PU, p. 235). In other words, Hartmann takes the 
opposite point of view to Schopenhauer: rather than denying the will to life through sexual 
abstinence, we should embrace our instinctual urges, and particularly sexuality, since this is 
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essential to the development of the human race towards a state of enlightenment. While love 
causes suffering and is thus condemnable from the egoistic point of view, ‘in the truly 
philosophical point of view [...] complete devotion to the process and welfare of the universal 
[...] is presented as first principle of practical philosophy, and thus also all instincts, absurd to 
conscious egoism but beneficial for the whole, are fully justified’ (PU, p. 241; author’s 
emphasis).  
 For Laforgue, this ethical dichotomy between Schopenhauer’s asceticism and 
Hartmann’s acceptance of sexuality is of central importance. Throughout his career, in both his 
published and private writings, he returns again and again to the question of whether the sexual 
instinct should be denied or embraced. Hailed as ‘l’Unique Loi’ by the male voice in the poetic 
dialogue of ‘Complainte des formalités nuptiales’ (OC, I, 578), the theme of sexual love 
dominates Laforgue’s mature œuvre. It is generally treated with the same cynicism that 
characterizes both Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s theorizations; this cynicism is encapsulated 
by ‘Complainte du soir des Comices agricoles’, where the post-coital disillusionment following 
a frolic in the fields is witheringly expressed: ‘Dans les foins | Crèvent deux rêves niais’ (OC, 
I, 594). Similarly, in ‘Complainte à Notre-Dame des Soirs’, the poet impugns ‘ces vendanges 
sexciproques’, declaring that ‘moi, moi Je m’en moque!’ (OC, I, 551). But while, for Laforgue, 
the sexual urge is unquestionably a trap – ‘Le but du génie de l’espèce est de nous abuser par 
l’appât idéal sur les fins qui le servent[;] mieux absolument il nous dupe, mieux nous aimons’ 
(OC, III, 955; author’s emphasis) – the Schopenhauerian solution of self-denial is never 
wholeheartedly embraced; Laforgue never entirely believes in its practicability or, indeed, its 
desirability, even if he persistently considers it as a possible ethical path. He is equally 
ambivalent about Hartmann’s call to engage in the life process through procreation, however. 
While his work registers a yearning for companionship, the domesticity of family life is only 
intermittently appealing, and is more often portrayed as a blind alley. Laforgue also rejects the 
fixed gender roles associated with such a life: although his attitudes towards women may seem, 
on a superficial reading, to be marred by Schopenhauerian misogyny, he in fact laments the 
way in which patriarchal society has reduced women to sexual objects and reproductive 
machines.32 He dreams, rather, of making women ‘véritablement nos compagnes égales, nos 
amies intimes, des associés d’ici-bas, les habiller autrement, leur couper les cheveux, leur tout 
dire’ (OC, III, 1101). Moreover, he also hints at a vision of sexual relationality that involves 
                                                     
32 See Claire White, ‘Laforgue, Beauvoir, and the Second Sex’, Dix-Neuf, 20, no. 1 (2016), 
110-24. 
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mutual pleasure without the burdens of procreation, thus eluding the perils of both 
Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s ethics. 
 For Schopenhauer, asceticism is not the only means of countering the tyranny of the 
Will; aesthetic experience also provides an escape, albeit only a temporary one (unlike 
renunciation, which offers a permanent solution). While reason is subservient to will in ‘all 
animals and almost all men’ (WWR, I, 152; my emphasis), for the select few it is possible for 
reason to ‘withdraw from this subjection, throw off its yoke, and, free from all the aims of the 
will, exist purely for itself, simply as a clear mirror of the world’ (WWR, I, 152). This 
disinterested perception – that is, a form of perception unconditioned by desire for something 
– is the source of art. In aesthetic experience, we do not see the world in functional terms: 
‘Raised up by the power of the mind, we relinquish the ordinary way of considering things’ 
(WWR, I, 178). If we cease to see an object through the lens of our aims and desires, then ‘what 
is thus known is no longer the individual thing as such, but the Idea, the eternal form’ (WWR, 
I, 179; author’s emphasis). Whether we are creating it or consuming it, art is the ‘purest joy’ 
of life; but it only offers a temporary release from willing, ‘a fleeting dream’ (WWR, I, 314). 
Despite this, aesthetics plays a central role in Schopenhauer’s philosophical system. For 
Hartmann, on the other hand, the creation and contemplation of art are of relatively minor 
importance. In his chapter on aesthetics, Hartmann’s main concern is to draw a distinction 
between the concept of genius and that of mere talent. He holds that the source of genius is the 
Unconscious, which bestows the work of art upon the artist in a single stroke; on the other 
hand, the ordinary artist proceeds in a laboriously piecemeal fashion, merely combining 
elements of perceptual experience in new ways. The artist of genius receives inspiration from 
the Unconscious without effort and without any understanding of how it is received, and 
Hartmann conveys the mysterious nature of this process by describing inspiration as ‘a gift of 
the gods’ (PU, p. 278).  
 Hartmann’s aesthetics also aims to overcome the dichotomy between idealism and 
relativism, and in this sense Laforgue wholeheartedly endorses the philosopher’s theories: the 
Unconscious is an ideal, but not a fixed ideal. Rather, it is in a perpetual state of flux, producing 
different forms of creative expression at different times and places. The (Classicist) notion of 
an eternally unchanging aesthetic ideal is therefore erroneous. However, as I have shown 
elsewhere,33 Laforgue departs from Hartmannian aesthetics in at least one key respect: he does 
                                                     
33 Sam Bootle, ‘Jules Laforgue and the Illusion of Spontaneity’, Dix-Neuf, 15, no. 2 (2011), 
166-76. 
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not envisage the creative process as involving a single moment of inspiration (as Hartmann 
does for the work of genius), but as essentially improvisatory. In his brief critical notes on 
Rimbaud, whose poems he read near the end of his life following their 1886 publication in La 
Vogue, Laforgue makes a statement that applies equally well to his own poetry: 
Une poésie n’est pas un sentiment que l’on communique tel que conçu avant la plume – 
Avouons le petit bonheur de la rime, et les déviations occasionnées par les trouvailles, la 
symphonie imprévue vient escorter le motif. (OC, III, 194; author’s emphasis) 
  
Indeed, he uses similar phrasing in an 1885 review of Les Complaintes co-written with Charles 
Henry, remarking on the ‘notes voulues ou raccrochées au petit bonheur de la plume’ and the 
‘trouvailles de formules’ (OC, III, 154) in the collection. Moreover, as Anne Holmes has 
shown, analysis of Laforgue’s manuscripts demonstrates that his creative process was 
characterized not by spontaneity, but by a laborious process of drafting and redrafting.34 
Laforgue is perhaps closer, then, to Hartmann’s picture of the ordinary artist (rather than the 
artist of genius); the suffering that the ordinary artist undergoes in his efforts to create is 
certainly foregrounded by Laforgue. In this sense, he also departs from Schopenhauer, who 
views creative experience as an escape from suffering, not as being inspired by it.  
 Laforgue’s dynamic and, at times, critical engagement with his philosophical sources 
is largely the product of his own idiosyncratic thinking. But it is also closely connected to the 
reception of the two philosophers by late nineteenth-century French critics, as well as being 
embedded in a broader cultural context. For example, Laforgue’s focus on Schopenhauer and 
Hartmann’s ethical theories echoes the contemporary critical reception, which tended to 
emphasize their ethics (especially concerning love, sex and marriage) at the expense of other 
aspects of their thought. Both philosophers were also viewed as unremitting pessimists (even 
though both offer solutions to the problem of suffering). Moreover, their pessimism was 
portrayed as a disease-like force, a miasmatic stench wafting over the Rhine and infecting the 
minds of the French, especially young men. Schopenhauer’s doctrine of chastity was also seen 
to be corrupting at a time when France’s demographic weakness undermined the possibility of 
avenging its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. These metaphors of contagion cast German 
philosophy as fundamentally ‘other’ to the French body politic. 
Ideas of Otherness and the Otherness of Ideas 
                                                     
34 Anne Holmes, Jules Laforgue and Poetic Innovation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 
82-86. 
17 
 
 
While the notion of Germany as France’s ‘other’ is established early in the nineteenth century, 
the idea that it is France’s ennemi héréditaire gains prevalence in the wake of the Franco-
Prussian War. The contestation of the border between the two nations had been a prominent 
political issue before, notably during the Rhine crisis of the 1840s, but it was not until 1871 
that the border was actually redrawn with the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the newly 
formed German Empire. In the early Third Republic, nationalism in France took on a 
particularly patriotic and xenophobic form, replacing the earlier ‘humanitarian nationalism’ 
that held up France as the paragon of an egalitarian political order (an idea that emerged after 
the first Revolution but that persisted well into the nineteenth century).35 This new right-wing 
nationalism found its hero in the figure of Georges Ernest Boulanger – ‘Général Revanche’– 
whose popularity in the late 1880s demonstrates the tenacity of irredentist sentiment in France. 
 But revanchisme was not the only ideology to emerge from the French defeat. New 
theories of nationhood as ‘affective community’ were put forward in response to German 
claims that Alsace-Lorraine was culturally and ethnically German, and thus rightfully theirs. 
In October 1870, Numa Denis Foustel de Coulanges argued that a nation was ‘une communauté 
d’idées, d’intérêts, d’affections, de souvenirs et d’espérances’;36 twelve years later, Ernest 
Renan’s Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (1882) expressed similar ideas: 
Dans le passé, un héritage de gloire et de regrets à partager, dans l’avenir un même programme 
à réaliser; avoir souffert, joui, espéré ensemble, voilà ce qui vaut mieux que des douanes 
communes et des frontières conformes aux idées stratégiques; voilà ce qu’on comprend malgré 
la diversité de race et de langue.37 
The idea of nation as ‘imagined community’ thus emerges in prototypical form in the late 
nineteenth century. But Benedict Anderson’s theory is distinct from Renan’s in insisting on the 
importance of print capitalism, and thus language, in the imagining of nationhood. While for 
Renan linguistic diversity within France shows that language is not essential to national unity, 
for Anderson the emergence of standard print languages in the nineteenth century was crucial 
to the rise of the nation-state as the dominant geopolitical form. 
                                                     
35 Raoul Girardet, Le nationalisme français, 1871-1914 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), pp. 13-
14. 
36 Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, L’Alsace est-elle allemande ou française? Réponse à M. 
Mommsen, professeur à Berlin (1870), quoted in Girardet, p. 62. 
37 Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (1882), quoted in Girardet, p. 66. 
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 The importance of language to the imagined community lies principally in its role in 
the popular press, which constitutes a vector for ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’.38 But language 
is also important in the more rarefied sphere of philosophy, where it again plays its part in 
constructing national identity. From the early eighteenth century, Latin had been in decline as 
the ‘language of philosophy’, usurped by French39 (which also held the status of diplomatic 
language). But from the late eighteenth century, German philosophers increasingly turned to 
their mother tongue; Kant, most notably, wrote his later works in German. From the early 
nineteenth century, then, German and French philosophers were increasingly perceived as 
belonging to distinct, even competing national philosophical traditions, rather than as a part of 
a transnational philosophical community. The notion of German philosophy as ‘other’, as 
fundamentally opposite to French philosophy, was popularized by Germaine de Staël’s De 
l’Allemagne. A product of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, she was nonetheless seminal in 
constructing German otherness. 
 While the construction of the ‘other’ is not central to Anderson’s idea of the imagined 
community, it is implicit in his statement that the nation is ‘imagined as both inherently limited 
and sovereign’.40 This limitation is crucial because ‘even the largest [nation] has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations’.41 The obverse, then, of the imagining of 
community is the conception of who is not part of that national community – the imagining of 
otherness. This exclusionary thinking is central to Fredrik Barth’s theory of the formation of 
ethnic groups.42 For Barth, what is fundamental to the constitution of an ethnic group is not 
‘the cultural characteristics of the members’ or ‘the organizational form of the group’, but 
rather ‘the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders’.43 In Daniele 
Conversi’s words, ‘Ethnogenesis is not an endogenous process’ but rather requires the 
                                                     
38 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 1991), p. 7. 
39 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-
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40 Anderson, p. 6; my emphasis. 
41 Anderson, p. 7. 
42 Fredrik Barth, ‘Introduction’, in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization 
of Culture Difference, ed. by Fredrik Barth (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1998), pp. 9-38. 
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construction of ‘opposition, an external other’.44 The invention of ‘the other’ is essential not 
only to ethnic nationalism, but to the imagining of nations in general: nationalism, as Michael 
Billig points out, ‘constructs a constant and politically mobilisable sense of otherness’,45 
affirming the self through a negation of what is not-self.46 Differences between peoples and 
groups within the nation are, meanwhile, relativized and subordinated ‘in such a way that it is 
the symbolic difference between “ourselves” and “foreigners” which wins out and which is 
lived as irreducible.’47 The logic of identification is thus circular: membership of the national 
group is based on perceived similarity; and the perception of similarity is grounded in 
membership of the national group. 
 There is also a kind of doublethink at work in the construction of otherness. National 
‘others’ (like Germany) can be subsumed back into a broader sense of self (‘the West’) in the 
name of establishing an opposition with a greater ‘other’ (‘the East’). Edward Said hints at this 
dynamic, multi-layered process in Orientalism: 
The construction of identity – for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, 
while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction – 
involves establishing opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous 
interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us’. Each age and society creates 
its ‘Others’. Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of ‘other’ is a much worked-over 
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historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving 
individuals and institutions in all societies.48 
Indeed, a negative approach to the definition of identity – that is, defining ‘self’ through its 
opposition to ‘other’ – is less fraught than a positive approach, particularly for a large, diverse, 
and rapidly changing society like nineteenth-century France or (to an even greater degree) 
Europe. The essentialized ‘other’ serves as a fixed point to which self-identity, with all of its 
nebulosity and uncertainty, can be anchored: ‘the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the 
West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.’49 The Orient represents the 
‘shadow side’ of Western identity, emerging ‘according to a detailed logic governed not simply 
by empirical reality but by a battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections.’50 
Indeed, projection is crucial both to Orientalist discourse and to the construction of German 
otherness, the pathologization of German philosophy representing an attempt to disavow the 
internal factors involved in France’s decline.  
 
*** 
 The notion of German philosophy as ‘other’ has deep roots in the nineteenth century, 
as Chapter 1 shows. However, after 1870 German philosophical influence – especially that of 
Schopenhauer and Hartmann – is portrayed as not only alien, but also dangerous, invasive, 
corrupting. While the pathologization of Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s influence is related to 
the actual invasion of French territory during the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War, it also 
expresses broader anxieties about the decline of the French body politic, of which the French 
defeat is just the most prominent example. Chief among these anxieties was the weakness of 
demographic growth in France, which prompted deep concern about the fertility of the French 
populace. For the Decadent movement, however, national decline was a source of creative 
vitality, and Laforgue – who was sympathetic towards this movement – reconfigures illness 
and physical debility as aesthetic principles, as we shall see in Chapter 2. His redisposition of 
the discourse of disease and decline, which is used to demonize the influence of German 
philosophy, thus constitutes a form of political oppositionality. It also radically subverts the 
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aesthetics of Schopenhauer and Hartmann even as it draws on their pessimistic insistence on 
suffering, demonstrating the dynamic nature of Laforgue’s engagement with his philosophical 
sources. 
 The notion of ‘oppositionality’, as theorized by Ross Chambers, suggests resistance to 
systems of power from within.51 In this sense, it is premised on the Foucauldian notion that 
there is no ‘outside’, no exteriority, to power – no Archimedean political position from which 
a regime can be hoisted off its access. In arguing for the importance of ideas of otherness to 
Laforgue’s reception of philosophy, I am not, then, asserting that there is in reality some ‘other’ 
that is outside of contemporary discourse; the ‘otherness’ of Germany and German philosophy 
is, of course, a socially constructed category. However, Laforgue appealed precisely to the 
possibility of this ‘other’ as a means of opposition, and in this sense he was very much typical 
of his era: 
If the dominant discourse was the speech and writing of a France resolutely middle class, self-
absorbed, and certain of its self-sufficiency, then in our period one of the most prominent and 
most influential of the counter-discourses mobilized to subvert it was what we might term the 
discourse of everywhere else [...].52 
Richard Terdiman is referring here to ‘texts about the imagined or actual trips which would 
remove one from the place where the dominant so effortlessly exercised its domination’,53 and 
this desire to escape was certainly an important aspect of Laforgue’s imagining of otherness. 
But the idea of German philosophy as ‘other’ also had a role to play in his critique of the 
prevailing bourgeois morality within France. In this sense, his reception of Schopenhauer and 
Hartmann conforms to Michel Espagne and Michaël Werner’s argument that cultural transfers 
should always be understood in terms of their role ‘à l’intérieur du système de réception’;54 and 
that within the receiving culture, they serve two functions, ‘une fonction de légitimation et une 
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fonction de subversion’.55 In both cases, ‘on cherche une caution extérieure destinée à étayer 
une argumentation qui n’a sa raison d’être qu’en fonction de la situation intérieure’.56 While 
the transgressive qualities of Laforgue’s formal experimentation (especially his pioneering vers 
libre) are widely accepted, the subversive nature of his thematics – most notably his treatment 
of the body and of sexual politics, which rejects contemporary nationalist visions of health and 
virility as the source of France’s renewal – is not always recognized. These thematic concerns 
are rooted in his reading of philosophy. 
 Laforgue’s engagement with German philosophy is not only based on opposition, but 
also on a search for a positive alternative, for a more meaningful existence that draws on the 
élan vital of the Unconscious – the ultimate metaphysical principle in Hartmann’s philosophy. 
In the course of this search, Laforgue considers the possibility that other cultures, including 
Germany, might offer a privileged means of access to the Unconscious. In this sense, 
Laforgue’s reception of German philosophy is informed by positive as well as negative 
discourses about German otherness, as Chapter 3 shows. He imagines Germany as ‘la terre 
bénie’ (OC, III, 343) of the Unconscious, thus recapitulating de Staël’s exoticized vision of 
Germany as the land of poetry, philosophy and music. But since the Unconscious is the 
overarching principle of all existence, Germany’s closeness to the Unconscious – its 
‘otherness’ to the restrictive Latinate culture of France – can only be contingent. Ultimately, 
access to the Unconscious must be sought within the self, and more particularly in the deepest, 
most powerful human instincts. In Laforgue’s work, the forest – long associated with myths of 
German national identity – emerges persistently as the locus where these instincts hold sway. 
The theme of sexuality is thus crucial to Laforgue’s engagement with philosophy. Again, 
oppositionality is important here, since Laforgue repudiates the fin-de-siècle pro-natalist 
discourse that sees procreative sex as the key to national regeneration. Instead he imagines a 
liberated form of sexual expression that allows desires to be fulfilled without the burdens of 
reproductive consequence.  
 Germany’s otherness was reinforced by its perceived association with India, as Chapter 
4 shows: German philosophy was seen to be especially susceptible to the influence of Indian 
thought, which Europe had encountered through Britain’s colonial rule and had studied with 
growing interest since the early years of the nineteenth century. Hartmann and (particularly) 
Schopenhauer were amongst those associated with Indian religion, especially Buddhism; 
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indeed, both explicitly drew parallels between their ideas and Buddhist doctrine. Laforgue’s 
use of Buddhist terms in his poetry can be traced to his philosophical reading, and his notes 
demonstrate his fascination with Buddhist ideas. His work also explores how ‘Eastern’ cultures 
are related to those of Europe, and in this he again draws on his philosophical sources. 
Schopenhauer adopted a perennialist standpoint, arguing that there is an eternal source of 
wisdom that is periodically revealed in certain cultures at certain times; (true) Christianity and 
Buddhism are thus rooted in the same unchanging source. For Hartmann, by contrast, 
philosophy and religion – both Eastern and Western – are part of an evolutionary process that 
culminates in his own philosophy of the Unconscious, and Buddhism is a more advanced form 
of thought than Christianity, largely because it recognizes the illusory nature of selfhood. 
Laforgue’s early work appears to propound a syncretistic approach to cultural relations that is 
reminiscent of Schopenhauer. His later work, however, bears the traces of Hartmann’s 
philosophical evolutionism: India and Indian thought are celebrated as both profound and 
liberating, offering a model for the West. 
 Laforgue’s view of India is thus informed by exoticism, which is also evident in his 
view of Germany. But while he sometimes indulges in this fetishization of otherness, at other 
times he undermines exoticist thinking. This is done both explicitly, through the parodying of 
literary exoticism, and implicitly, through the representation of cultural plurality: in 
recognizing the diversity of cultural forms, Laforgue moves away from the binary logic 
intrinsic to ‘otherness’ (which is one side of the self/ other opposition). The celebration of 
cultural difference, of the multiplicity of cultures and their interrelation, is premised on the 
notion that the disparities between cultures are not fundamental. This is a kind of 
cosmopolitanism, understood as entailing ‘the positive recognition of difference’ and ‘a 
conception of belonging as open’.57 For Laforgue, this heterogeneity is underwritten by the 
essential unity of all cultures, since all of human civilization is ultimately rooted in the 
Unconscious, the All-One. The contingent nature of cultural specificity challenges nationalist 
mythologies; and Laforgue’s questioning of the idea that nations constitute distinct entities is 
part of a broader argument (drawn from Hartmann) that all forms of individuality are 
fundamentally illusory. This includes the human individual: the multiplicity of quasi-
autonomous processes (both physical and mental) within each person implies that the notion 
                                                     
57 Gerard Delanty, ‘Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: The Paradox of Modernity’, in The 
SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, ed. by Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar 
(London: Sage, 2006), pp. 357-68 (p. 357). 
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of a unitary self is purely arbitrary. Laforgue’s reflections on otherness are thus bound up with 
his thinking on selfhood. 
 For Laforgue, the multiplicity within the self might permit some sort of tentative 
harmony, but it might also entail disintegration, dispersal and, finally, dissolution. Chapter 5 
shows how Laforgue explores the Buddhist idea of nirvana, which was contemporarily 
understood as equivalent to nothingness, and more specifically as self-annihilation. Nineteenth-
century critics of Buddhism were almost unanimous in seeing it as a religion that worshipped 
the void, and for some this nihilism implied that there was a fundamental schism in human 
nature between East and West. At times, Laforgue appears to construct a similar opposition, 
drawing a dichotomy between ‘la vie’ and ‘le néant’ that seems to map onto a West/ East 
divide. But if in Les Complaintes he draws inspiration from ‘la vie’ – which is associated with 
(sexual) love and with Hartmann’s philosophy –, in his next collection, L’Imitation de Notre-
Dame la Lune (1885), he explores ideas associated with ‘le néant’, namely the obliteration of 
selfhood and of sexual desire. Semantic nothingness – a void of sense – also haunts his work. 
Ultimately, though, Laforgue commits to neither of these alternatives: his work is characterized 
by fluctuation between self-affirmation and self-annihilation, sexual fulfilment and chastity, 
meaning and nonsense; and, moreover, by l’entre-deux, by indefinable or even paradoxical 
states between such extremes. 
 Laforgue’s treatment of ideas of otherness is complex and, at times, seemingly 
contradictory. In some of his texts, he seems to adopt an exoticist approach to foreign cultures, 
celebrating the ‘otherness’ of Germany and India. But in other texts, he critiques the idealistic 
pretensions of exoticism. This apparent tension can be at least partly resolved by the notion 
that the differences between cultures are merely contingent, that there is an underlying unity – 
a common source and a future reconciliation – to be found in the Unconscious. This notion, 
which emerges in various forms in Laforgue’s writings, suggests that the apparent otherness of 
other cultures is not essential or eternal, but rather provides a model for the development of 
French society. Through his idiosyncratic engagement with the ideas of Schopenhauer, 
Hartmann and Buddhist doctrine, Laforgue thus offers a critique of his own culture, and in 
particular of the dominant pro-natalist discourse. The suffering body and the desiring body – 
prevalent in his thematics and crucial as aesthetic principles – have political import too: 
countering the nationalistic bourgeois morality of his age, Laforgue propounds the release of 
corporeal energies, both negative (illness and debility) and positive (a liberated, non-
reproductive, mutually gratifying (hetero)sexuality).  
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Laforgue, poète philosophe (et ‘dilettante et pierrot’) 
Laforgue’s encounter with other cultures was not solely intellectual; it was also a lived reality, 
since he spent most of his adult life in Germany working as the French reader to the German 
Empress Augusta. During this period (November 1881 to September 1886), he was based at 
the Prinzessinnenpalais in Berlin, but also followed the Empress to her various residences in 
Wiesbaden, Baden-Baden, Koblenz, Hamburg and Babelsberg. His experience of Germany 
was somewhat limited by the fact that he never learnt German to any degree of proficiency, 
mainly because the Empress and her entourage were francophone; in a letter to Charles Henry 
he declares, ‘je ne parle que le français ici’ (OC, I, 758). Nonetheless, his expatriate status was 
a crucial factor in his approach to ideas of otherness. It was not, however, the sole factor: 
Laforgue’s concern with otherness precedes his departure for Germany. Indeed, it spans his 
literary career.  
 This persistent concern goes hand in hand with his enduring interest in philosophy. But 
in the course of his career, there are numerous shifts in his approach to philosophy, and his 
interpretation of philosophical ideas. These shifts are evident both in his published work and 
his private notes, although the difficulty of exactly dating these notes means that a detailed 
chronology of how his thinking develops is unfeasible. Instead, a broad chronological 
distinction between the two phases of his career can be drawn, with 1877-81 constituting his 
early period, and 1882-87 his mature period. 
 This early period is dominated by his first, unpublished collection Le Sanglot de la 
Terre, his most derivative piece of work. Laforgue ultimately abandoned the collection: his 
first sign of disillusionment emerges in March 1881, when he states that Le Sanglot ‘commence 
à me dégoûter parfois’ (OC, I, 697). His definitive rejection dates to the early months of 1882, 
but it is not until May 1883, in a letter to his sister Marie, that he clearly expresses the reasons 
for this:  
j’ai abandonné mon idéal de la rue Berthollet, mes poèmes philosophiques. Je trouve stupide de 
faire la grosse voix et de jouer de l’éloquence. Aujourd’hui que je suis plus sceptique et que je 
m’emballe moins aisément et que d’autre part je possède ma langue d’une façon plus minutieuse, 
plus clownesque, j’écris de petits poèmes de fantaisie, n’ayant qu’un but: faire de l’original à tout 
prix. (OC, I, 821) 
His repudiation of these ‘poèmes philosophiques’ does not imply that he also repudiates 
philosophy itself, however. It is, rather, the earnestness, even pomposity (‘la grosse voix’) of 
Le Sanglot that he has chosen to leave behind. In fact, he explicitly states his attachment to the 
philosophical aspect of the collection: in a letter to Kahn concerning his new collection Les 
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Complaintes, he justifies the inclusion of the poem ‘Préludes autobiographiques’ (against his 
friend’s advice) precisely because the poem marks his ‘philosophical’ phase: 
J’ai sacrifié un gros volume de vers philo. d’autrefois parce qu’ils étaient mauvais manifestement, 
mais enfin ce fut une étape et je tiens à dire […] qu’avant d’être dilettante et pierrot j’ai séjourné 
dans le Cosmique. (OC, II, 729) 
 
What Laforgue does not state here is that this new, more playful poetic mode (‘dilettante et 
pierrot’) is still deeply informed by his engagement with philosophy. Philosophical ideas and 
images are integrated into his work in a more subtle and ironic fashion, but their underlying 
importance is – if anything – even greater. 
 This book does not claim to trace every aspect of Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s 
importance to Laforgue; neither does it seek to inventorize every reference to their work. My 
concern is, rather, to think in broad terms about how his reading of philosophy is related to 
contemporary discourses and to his ideas on aesthetics (even if I do also highlight some specific 
intertextual links, and draw on previous critics’ work in this area). Suffering, desire, the 
fragmented self, the void: these are not only philosophically-inspired themes but also aesthetic 
principles for Laforgue, alongside the central doctrine of unconscious inspiration that is drawn 
from Hartmann’s work. My focus is, therefore, on poems that might be read as in some sense 
meta-poetic, poems that constitute significant turning points in his œuvre (such as ‘Préludes 
autobiographiques’, ‘Complainte du Sage de Paris’ and ‘L’Hiver qui vient’). It is in these 
poems, as well as in his private notes, that we see how deeply ideas of otherness inform his 
reception of German philosophy, and how tightly they are woven into his poetic project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
